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[Abstracts] 
We examine the effect of foreign direct investment by exporters on a price of their exporting 
products.  We propose several theoretical models of foreign direct investment for both vertical 
market structure and horizontal expansions of plants.  The features of models considered include 
partial ownership, bargaining power, multiple investments and capacity constraints. Existing 
empirical researches of foreign direct investment are mostly presented with macroeconomic 
aggregated data.  Our micro survey data offers explanations for purpose of foreign direct 
investment, indicating for either distribution subsidiary, production subsidiary, or both.  By 
distinguishing the purpose of investment, different hypothesis for the effects of foreign direct 
investment on exchange rate pass-through can be tested.  We find significant effects of foreign 
direct investments for both distribution subsidiary and production subsidiary.  Moreover, foreign 
direct investments in a European country are shown to affect exchange rate pass-through of other 
European countries whereas investments in an Asian country do not affect the pricing behavior in 
other Asian countries. 
 
Keywords: bargaining, exchange rate pass-through, foreign direct investment, horizontal and 
vertical structure, partial ownership 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: F12; F14; L63; L68 
                                                      
∗ Associate Professor of Economics, Kyushu Sangyo University, Japan.    This paper was completed 
while the author was a Visiting Research Associate of Economics, University of California, Santa 
Cruz during 2002 Aug – 2003 July.    I would like to thank all participants for their comments at 
Brownbag Seminar and West Coast Japan Economic Seminar at UCSC, IEFS Workshop at Central 
Michigan University, and European Trade Study Group Conference, Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid. This research is financially supported by a grant-in-aid from the Zengin Foundation for 
Studies on Economics and Finance. 
 
  11. Introduction 
  The lack of adjustment for the US current account after steady depreciation of the US dollar in 
the second half of the 1980s has re-motivated research examining the relationship between 
exchange rate and tradable prices.  The less than proportionate response of tradable prices to 
changes in exchange rates, termed as incomplete pass-through in the literature, has been well 
documented in other circumstances as well.  The seminal work by Dornbusch (1987) has 
suggested that the some features of imperfect competition, namely the number of competitors, finite 
demand elasticity, and etc., lead to incomplete pass-through.  Krugman (1987) on the other hand 
extended the decades old literature to a different direction, suggesting that same features affecting 
incomplete pass-through can explain the international price differentials arising from exchange rate 
fluctuations, termed as pricing-to-market.  Enormous amounts of research both theoretical and 
empirical have followed these works
1. 
  Rather than providing an additional empirical evidence of incomplete pass-through as a 
contribution, empirical research has recently shifted more toward focusing on the causes of 
incomplete pass-through.  Gron and Swenson (1996) has included the degree of local production 
in a pass-through equation to explain the partial reduction of pass-through with exporters with local 
plants.  Instead of reduced-form pass-through equation, Kadiyali (2000) uses a structural 
econometric framework to capture interacting effects of market structures and pricing strategies in 
the US photographic industry.  Bernhofen and Xu (2000) examines the effect of market share in 
exporting market in pass-through equation and finds that German and Japanese firms exercised 
significant market power in the US petrochemical market. 
  Recent development in macroeconomics in so-called new open economy macroeconomics takes 
these incomplete pass-through and pricing-to-market phenomena seriously into their dynamic 
general equilibrium model
2.  From the seminal work by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), many 
researchers have attempted to incorporate pricing behaviors of firms under imperfect competition in 
                                                      
1    See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a recent survey. 
2    See an excellent survey for new open economy macroeconomics by Lane (2001) 
  2 order to create deviation from perfectly flexible framework, see Chari and et al. (1998) and Corsetti 
and Pesenti (1997).  Their research motive is to create a theoretical model that is capable of 
producing long persistence and high volatility of exchange rate movement after monetary shock
3.  
It is, therefore, also important for new open economy macroeconomics to develop a more 
understanding of exchange rate pass-through behavior.   
  Whereas demand and cost fluctuations are, for each exporting firm, exogenous parameter that 
influence the pricing behavior, some changes in market structure, e.g., the entry decision to foreign 
markets or acquisition of foreign subsidiaries, are endogenously determined parameters that also 
affect the optimizing behavior.    In search of a larger market for products, a manufacturer begins to 
access to foreign markets without sufficient information for the local market.  Eventually 
exporting firm establishes distribution and production networks by setting up a new subsidiary firm 
or by acquisitions of local firms. 
  Figure 1 indicates that the number of Japanese foreign subsidiaries has almost doubled in recent 
ten years, 1988 - 1997.  The most significant region is Asia in which the number of foreign 
subsidiary has increased approximately 150 percent within the period.  Figure 2 summarized the 
response of Japanese parent firms to a questionnaire that asks for the most significant causes for 
establishing foreign subsidiaries.    Although inexpensive wage for labor is significant in developing 
countries in Asia, the major reason for foreign direct investment is to secure access for local 
markets. 
  Intuitively, it is clear that these changes in market structure might affect the pricing 
behavior of exporting firms, consequently, exchange rate pass-through as well.    In the next section 
we examine subsidiary-firm level data for Japanese foreign direct investments and summarizes 
some distinctive features. In section 3 and 4 we provide concrete theoretical foundations for 
particular channels through which foreign direct investments affect exchange rate pass-through.  
                                                      
3    There are many other empirical works that attempt to uncover the cause of long persistence and 
high volatility of exchange rate movement from different directions, see Engel (1999) and Cheung 
and Lai (2000). 
  3Section 3 presents a model of bilateral duopoly with partial ownership and bargaining. Section 4 
describes a model of substitute subsidiaries. Section 5 describes data and an econometric 
methodology.    Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Japanese Foreign Direct Investment 
  In this section we closely examine the micro survey data published as the Overseas 
Japanese Companies Data by Toyo Keizai to summarize the overall distinctive features of Japanese 
foreign direct investments.  These data contains relevant information for approximately 19000 
Japanese foreign subsidiaries.  The notable features can be summarized in the following three 
subsections; significant portion of direct shareholding by Japanese parent companies are only partial 
although 100%-owned subsidiaries are pervasive, the purpose of foreign direct investment for 
Japanese subsidiaries are distinguished between marketing and production, and multiple number of 
foreign direct investments in same product category can be usually attributed to different competing 
companies in the same industry. 
    
2.1. Partial Ownership 
  “Subsidiary firm” can be defined with different magnitude of shareholding by a parent 
firm.    Without saying that 100% shareholding by a parent firm absolutely makes a firm subsidiary, 
a share exceeding 50% provides a shareholding company majority vote to fully control a subsidiary 
company.  However, even when shareholding of a parent company is below 50%, it can exercise 
controlling power over other disseminated shareholders.  First, we note distinguishing feature of 
international shareholding structure in Figure 3
4.  Although over 8,000 Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries are fully owned by corresponding Japanese parent companies, 13.8% of Japanese 
subsidiary firms are actually 100%-subsidiary of another Japanese subsidiary firms.    These 
                                                      
4  Out of 19,197 subsidiary firm data, information about shareholding was not obtained for 375 
subsidiary firms.    We have used only 18,822 firm data, which accounted for shareholding 
information, for this subsection.    See Figure 5 for detailed descriptions. 
  4 firms do not have direct capital relationship with Japanese companies but indirectly owned via 
international capital network by Japanese multinational corporations.  69.4% of Japanese 
subsidiary are owned by Japanese parent company and local firms in a recipient country.    Figure 4 
and 5 represent shareholding of Japanese multinational corporations in Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries in the world.  It points out outstanding clusters around two figures, namely 50% and 
100%.    Full ownership by a parent firm accounts for 51.3-64.3% of all foreign subsidiaries.    This 
is largely due to the fact that, unless it is a joint venture with a firm in a recipient country, newly 
established firm, or greenfield FDI, must be entirely financed by a parent company.   
50%-shareholding, which is a threshold value for absolutely majority ownership, accounts for 
9.2-10.9%.  It is noteworthy here that large portion of Japanese foreign subsidiary firms are not 
operated under full control of Japanese multinational corporations.     
  It is more striking that structure of subsidiary shareholding are quite different among 
recipient countries as we look into top three recipient countries, namely US, China and Thailand, of 
Japanese FDI.  Whereas full ownership is more eminent, 73.9%, in the most recipient country of 
Japanese FDI, the US, the second most recipient country, China, observes only 24.7% of full 
ownership by Japanese parent company and for the third most recipient country, Thailand, it is only 
16.1%, see Figures 6 - 8.    These distinctive figures between the US and Asian countries of course 
largely reflects the difference in inward FDI policies among recipient countries.  China and 
Thailand only recently lifted foreign ownership restrictions. 
       
2.2 Distribution and Manufacturing FDI 
  With macroeconomic aggregated data, foreign direct investment are treated as general 
investment by foreign capital and all the strategic properties of foreign direct investment by parent 
companies are suppressed.    With our survey data, Japanese parent companies are asked to describe 
the purpose or role of their subsidiaries.  In figure 9, purposes of subsidiaries are categorized as 
  5either “sales,” “production,” or “services, lease, R&D or others.”
5  The “sales” box and 
“production” box indicate that the purpose of FDI include “sales” and “production,” respectively.  
So subsidiaries categorized in “sales” box may or may not act as “service, lease, R&D or others ” 
subsidiaries as well.  The last box labeled as “service, lease, R&D or others” are actually those 
subsidiaries which did not contain response of either “sales” or “production” for the purpose of 
subsidiaries by their parent firms.     
  Over 50 percent of all subsidiaries have a function of overseas sales and 42 percent of all 
subsidiaries have production facility.  In the following section we need to distinguish these two 
main purposes of subsidiaries, namely “sales” and “production.” 
 
2.3 Multiple FDIs in Same Product Category 
  Since our corresponding data for exports are not firm-brand specific, our product 
categories include some extent of within-product heterogeneity.   Although our trade data are most 
disaggregated data publicly available for Japanese exports, a product category needs to be 
considered as a group of firm-brand specific products.  Within this category we can usually 
observe multiple foreign direct investments in each recipient country.  In building a theoretical 
model of foreign direct investment and obtaining testable hypotheses for empirical analysis, we 
need to scrutinize each establishment of these multiple foreign direct investments.       
  Specifically foreign direct investments for electronics and electronics parts industry 
category, we summarized top 20 major Japanese parent corporations by top 10 major 
Japanese-FDI-recipient countries in Table 1.  Matsushita Electronics (known internationally as 
Pansonics) has the most number of subsidiaries, 63 establishments, and the average of oversea 
subsidiaries for top 20 multinationals is over 30 establishments.  Within a broad category as 
electronics and electronics parts industry, one can observe multiple FDIs by same corporations.  
This requires a theoretical model capable of explaining for multiple FDIs in a foreign country by a 
                                                      
5  “Production” includes either production, assembly, or processing. 
  6 parent exporter.    However, when the business description of each subsidiary is scrutinized in Table 
2 and 3 as examples, each investment by these two individual firms are intended for different 
category of products or different purpose of business, i.e., production or sales.  A prospective 
theoretical model capable of incorporating a case, for example, the first row of air conditioner and 
the third row of electric iron subsidiaries of Matsushita Electronics in Table 2 should be built with 
independently different demands for each product rather than with differentiated products in the 
same  industry.         
 
  3. Vertical Structure Model: Bilateral Monopolies with Partial Ownership and Bargaining 
  Here we focus on an equilibrium transfer price between a single exporter and a single 
local firm.    We restrict the number of firms to be only one in both exporting and importing country, 
in order to accentuate the role of interaction between two firms with bilateral bargaining and partial 
ownership, while suppressing interaction effect from other local firms or other competing exporters.       
As discussed in the previous section, we explicitly incorporate in a model that the fact large portion 
of subsidiaries are partially owned and transfer price are determined in a bargaining process 
between managers of parent and subsidiary firms. 
  In this section, preferences for consumer and technology for firms are extremely 
simplified.    Demand for a Japanese export is a liner function, q = d - P. Subsuming feedback from 
and interaction between input markets, we assume constant marginal cost for both an exporter and a 
downstream firm. 
    An objective function for both firms is net sales profit which is margin times sales quantity, 
q. Margin of a Japanese exporter is a transfer price, w, minus constant upstream marginal cost, cU.  
For a downstream firm margin is final market price, P, minus constant downstream marginal cost, 
cD, minus transfer price in terms of importing country’s currency.         
  ( U wcq ) U π =−          ( 1 )  
  ( DD Pc e w q ) π =−−         ( 2 )  
  It is important to note what these costs might represent for these firms.  For an exporter 
  7cU represents production costs and transportation costs for both domestic and international shipping.   
Although our focus is not on the pricing-to-market phenomena of Japanese exporters, existence of 
Japanese final market is implicit in this model plays an important role in international 
macroeconomics.  However, our assumption of constant marginal cost for the exporter in this 
model insulates any effects might arise from Japanese final market.  If we are to incorporate 
Japanese final market explicitly in the model, we can additionally observe pricing-to-market of 
exporters but exchange rate pass-through, our main concern in this paper, to importing country will 
not  be  affected.      
  For downstream firm cD can play dual roles in our framework.  If we are to interpret 
downstream firm as a local distributor, cD represents transportation cost in importing country, other 
distributional cost, and any other local costs, from advertising to translation of packages.  On the 
other hand, we could also interpret the same model as that an exporter is producing intermediate 
products and downstream firm is producing final product with imported intermediate goods as 
inputs; or an exporter is shipping unassembled products to a downstream firm which merely put 
these parts together to finish the products to avoid severe international trade regulation on imports 
of finished products in the country. 
At the second-stage final market, a downstream firm chooses quantity to maximize its profits as 
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The optimal sales quantity for downstream firm can be shown to be a function of transfer price. 
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At the first-stage intermediate market, having demand function of consumers and optimal behavior 
of downstream firm as common knowledge, profit of two firms can also be expressed in terms of 
transfer price. 
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In a simple successive monopolies model, where an exporter has entire bargaining power over 
transaction in an intermediate market, the exporter sets transfer price to maximize its net sales 
revenue, equation (5), with the knowledge of derived demand schedule of downstream firm, 
equation (4).   
  However, the assumption that an exporter solely determines transfer price and a 
downstream firm behaves as a price-taker is not accurate description of the bilateral relationship.  
Although not explicitly modeled in this paper, With the option to leave from transaction, a single 
downstream firm should have some negotiating power.     
  Even if there exist other possible downstream firms in an intermediate market, specific- 
relationship asset invested by the exporter make transaction with this particular downstream firm 
more attractive.  In next  subsection, we will continue to investigate export pricing behavior in the 
case with the presence of other downstream firms for some special case. 
    Here, the exporter and downstream firm engage in transaction profitable to both firms, but 
their own profit maximizing strategies are in conflict for determining the level of transfer price of 
exporting products.    We assume two firms engage in a non-cooperative Nash-bargaining process to 
determine the transfer price.    The Nash-bargaining problem for these two firms can be summarized 
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The first order condition for the Nash-bargaining solution can be rearranged as follows. 
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The transfer price in terms of currency of importing country can be solved as follows. 
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By differentiating equation (10) by each parameters, we can obtain expected changes in the 
exchange rate pass-through with respect to changes in bargaining power and share of ownership.  
For any  [0,1] and  [0,1] α β ∈∈
 and 
, the exchange rate pass-through is shown to be increasing and 
decreasing function of  α β ,  respectively.   
  2
(2 ) ( )
0









∂− − + −














∂− − + −
>       ( 1 3 )  
  Attaining stronger bargaining position, i.e. increase in  α , an exporter can use his market 
power to increase transfer price toward the monopoly pricing level.  This can be understood as 
moving from equating marginal cost to demand schedule toward equating marginal cost to marginal 
revenue schedule, in which price is less responsive to change in marginal cost.  This price less 
responsiveness leads to less exchange rate pass-through.  Acquiring share of ownership in 
downstream firm, i.e. increase in  β , an exporter can gain a new income stream from the profit of 
downstream by lowering transfer price away from monopoly pricing level.  This is just exactly 
opposite movement of pricing mechanism described for increase in bargaining power.     
 
  The most probable description of foreign direct investment can be captured in changes in 
  10terms of our parameters,   and  α β
0 1) and 
.    For the convenience we use subscript 0 and 1 for parameters 
to denote before and after foreign direct investment.  As we argued earlier some non-zero 
bargaining power must be distributed to both parties before any investment by an exporter takes 
place, that is,      0 (0, 0 α β ∈= .    After the exporter becomes a shareholder of downstream 
firm, bargaining power of the exporter must not decrease, i.e.  10 1 and 0 α αβ ≥> .  If we assume 
the bargaining power of an exporter does not change after acquiring share of downstream firm, 
change in exchange rate pass-through is obvious from equation (13) and we formally state this as 
next lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: If an exporter’s acquiring share of an independent local firm does not change the 
bargaining power of the exporter, the exchange rate pass-through increases. 
 
  Although we have not assumed any interacting relationship between   and  α β , it is 
natural to assume that share increase in ownership of downstream firm should strengthen the 
bargaining position of exporter.  If we assume bargaining power is increasing function of share 
ownership, it is not obvious how foreign direct investment affect exchange rate pass-through 
because  sign  of  equation (12) and (13) are  opposite.   
 
Proposition 1: If acquiring  1 β share of an independent local firm increases bargaining power of 









, exchange rate pass-through decreases. 
 
  The condition in Proposition 1 can be better understood in Figure 9 and 10.  In Figure 9 
the pair  0 and  α λ
0  and 
 in the area above the curve satisfies the condition and therefore a proportional 
change in export price with respect to exchange rate fluctuations decreases after Japanese 
companies acquire share of local firms.  Figure 10 represents an example for a pair of 
0 0.5 0 α β == ,  λ must be larger than 1.5 for meeting the necessary condition in Proposition 
  111.   
 
  4. Horizontal Expansion Model: Plants Expansion with Increasing Marginal Cost 
  In addition to the effect of FDI for distributor, we also examine the effect of foreign direct 
investment for local production in this section.    Gron and Svenson (1996) examine empirically the 
effect of local production plants on exchange rate pass-through in automobile industry.      Although 
Gron and Svenson do not provide any theoretical model, their empirical evidence indicates that the 
ability to produce in multiple locations gives firms more flexibility to adjust to changes in exchange 
rates, resulting in a smaller pass-through
6.   
  Focusing on local production effect, there is a very important concept we need to distinguish 
when analyzing exchange rate pass-through.  When a domestic manufacturing firm exports final 
products as automobile firms considered in Gron and Svenson (1996), owing production plants in 
both domestic country and a foreign country enable an exporter to adjust with flexibility to 
exchange rate fluctuations by modifying their production weight for two production sites.  In this 
case these plants across national borders function as substitutes to each other.  This effect can be 
called as “substitute” effect and examined with a simple model in this section. 
  If a domestic manufacturing firm exports intermediate products or product parts to foreign 
final-product manufacturing firm, these two plants function as compliments to each other.  It is 
compliment in a sense that increase in production at one plant leads to increase in production of the 
other
7.    If a newly acquired foreign plant acts as complimentary plant, our previous vertical model 
in section 3 can be reinterpreted as complimentary model.   
  In this subsection we analyze the effect of foreign direct investment for local production plant 
as a substitute to existing domestic plants.    Upon constructing a model, the purpose of establishing 
a local plant overseas needs to be carefully reexamined.  If a firm only needs to switch to foreign 
                                                      
6  However, we note that the estimated coefficients of multiple location are sometimes insignificant 
in their estimation result. 
7  These uses of terminology are familiar in multinational corporation literature, see Blonigen 
(2001). 
  12production due to relatively cheap labor cost, a domestic plant can be shut down at the start of 
foreign production to maintain the level of firm’s global production.  This FDI process should be 
investigated by comparing two domestic plant case and one domestic plant and one foreign plant 
case.   If a firm also intends to increase its global production level, appropriate analysis should 
involve the comparison of single domestic plant case and one domestic plant and one foreign plant 
case.  In the followings, the exchange rate pass-through are examined respectively for ‘single 
domestic plant,’ ‘two domestic plants,’ and ‘one domestic plant and one foreign plant’ case.   
 
[Single domestic plant] 
  First, we examine the exchange rate pass-through for single domestic plant case as a baseline 
for the later analysis of FDI effect on the exchange rate pass-through. Our specification for a local 
plant model follows very close to our local distributor model except for a slight modification on 
cost function.  Since we focus on multi-plant model, maintaining constant marginal cost 
assumption from a local plant model causes a severe problem.  For a multi-plant case the relative 
share of production for each plant becomes indeterminate if each plant has same constant marginal 
cost.    If the level of marginal cost differs for each plants, production takes a place only on a plant 
with the lowest marginal cost.    For international multi-plant case, this means that entire amount of 
production switches back and forth across national border if exchange rate fluctuates.  So we 
assume increasing marginal cost for production in the following analysis.   
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Rearranging first order condition for maximizing profit for single plant gives pricing equaiton as   
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  13Solving for exchange rate pass-through as equation (16), we find that incomplete pass-through 
holds for our model specification. 
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[Two domestic plants] 
  Before we directly compare the result for single domestic plant case with one domestic plant 
and one local plant case, we examine the effect of extending the number of production plants on 
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Comparing  equation (16) and (19) reveals  that  increase in the number of plants decreases the level 
of exchange rate pass-through if the curvature of cost function, denominated in foreign currency 
term, is not large, ec1<2.  Although we have analyzed only for plant expansion case from single 
plant to two plants, this condition on the curvature of cost function can be generalized for arbitrary 
number of plants (see the Appendix B.)       
 
[One domestic plant and one foreign plant] 
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From equation (22) it is obvious that relative cost of domestic plant and foreign plant affects the 
degree of exchange rate pass-through.    However, we set these two costs equal in order to isolate a 
pure effect of foreign direct investment for a subsidiary production.     
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       ( 2 3 )  
From comparison of equation  (19)  with  (23), it is surprising to find that replacing a domestic plant 
with a foreign plant decreases the level of exchange rate pass-through if the same condition for the 
curvature of cost function holds, i.e., ec1<2.  Although coincidence of these conditions is surely 
due to our specifications for assumptions, we believe that we can claim in general that foreign direct 
investment for local plants decreases exchange rate pass-through if the conditions hold for 
decreasing exchange rate pass-through with expansion of the number of domestic plants. 
  Acquiring a new foreign plant can have two distinct effects on pricing behavior of 
exporters.    Plant expansion effect can occur because an exporter now has a lower average marginal 
cost over all plants.  At the same time, portion of production cost is insulated from exchange rate 
shocks due to local production and that affects the price of exports from domestic plant as well.  
We summarize the result in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: When a new plant is established in a foreign market, either as an additional plant or 
as a replacing plant for a closed-down domestic plant, the level of exchange rate pass-through 
decreases. 
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5. Empirical Methodology and Data 
5.1. Empirical model 
  In this subsection we will introduce an empirical model to capture the effect of establishing 
foreign subsidiaries on exchange rate pass-through, using panel data for a sample of Japanese 
exports and foreign direct investments.  We will follow the previous panel estimation approach 
used in empirical exchange rate pass-through literature, in line with Knetter (1989) and Takagi and 
Yoshida (2001).  Our innovation in pass-through estimation is inclusion of FDI variables in order 
to test the hypothesis that FDI affects the degree of exchange rate pass-through.  In order to 
capture the different implication of forms of FDI, the FDI variables are constructed in a way to 
distinguish the purpose of investments, namely local production and local distribution.     
 
  it it it it i t it pe e F D I β γα λ =+ + + + ε        ( 2 4 )  
 
  Our general estimation model for pass-through equation is expressed in equation (24).    The log 
of price denominated in the currency of destination market,  , is regressed on the log of the 
foreign currency price of the Japanese yen,  , FDI variable,  , a fixed country effect error 
component, 
it p
FDI it e it
i α , a fixed time effect error component,  t λ , and a disturbance term,  it ε .  An 
exchange rate pass-through, β, is defined as a percentage change in export price with respect to a 
percentage change in exchange rate.  Currency denomination is so chosen that complete 
pass-through means unity in an exchange rate pass-through coefficient.  The FDI variable is 
multiplied by exchange rate in order to capture the effect of subsidiaries on exchange rate 
pass-through, rather than on the price level.    Inclusion of FDI variable in the pass-through equation 
is utilized in Gron and Swenson (1996) although destination market is only restricted to a single 
country, namely the US, and FDI is strictly restricted only for US plants.  Therefore, testing the 
effect of local production on pass-through with expanding a sample data to a panel of destination 
countries is also our contribution to the literature, without saying innovation of testing effect of 
  16local distribution. 
  The fixed effect error component is necessary for eliminating absolute price level dispersion 
among destination countries, due to the differences in quality level of products and trade barriers.  
Without a directly observed cost data, estimated exchange rate pass-through might be biased since 
an observed price movement is also affected by the change in industry cost.    Time dummy variable 
is introduced to capture these underlying cost fluctuations. 
 
5.2. Hypothesis Consistent with Our Models 
  We have obtained from our models the general conclusion that foreign direct investments have 
effects on the level of exchange rate pass-through as formally presented in Section 3 and 4, however, 
the effect of investments can be significantly different whether investments are vertical or 
horizontal and whether investments has significant effects on bargaining power of an exporter in the 
case of vertical investment. 
  In section 3 we analyzed the model in which investments are directed toward downstream firms.   
As repeatedly stated, a downstream firm we concern in the model can be either a distribution firm 
or a manufacturing firm.    If bargaining process between an exporter and its downstream firm is not 
considered, the effect of foreign direct investment is unambiguously positive on exchange rate 
pass-through.  However, if foreign direct investment strengthen the bargaining position of an 
exporter, the compound effect of ownership acquirement and bargaining power shift is no longer 
straightforward.    As formally stated in Proposition 1 in section 3, a relative increase in bargaining 
power of an investing exporter is large with respect to change in ownership, the effect of foreign 
direct investment for downstream firm on exchange rate pass-through becomes negative.  This is 
most likely if managerial concern drives the firm’s profit maximization. 
  In section 4 we looked at different type of foreign direct investment; horizontal expansion of 
manufacturing plants.  In this model we needed some underlying structure to keep an exporter 
from shutting down domestic manufacturing plants.  Otherwise, there would be no exports after 
foreign direct investments.  Plausible underlying structures can be inclusion of dynamic concern 
  17for exporters with sunk cost, plant-level capacity constraints, domestic labor-union opposition or 
some other regulatory restraints.  Our choice of tool for the model was assumption of increasing 
marginal cost for an exporter.  With this assumption we derived an unambiguous result for the 
horizontal plant expansion model; positive effect on exchange rate pass-through. 
  With our data sample, we have several firms in each category although we assumed a single 
exporter in our models.  Without any additional assumptions, extending our model to oligopoly 
exporters framework can be troublesome because the first firm having an opportunity to establish its 
own subsidiary can lower its transfer price below exporter’s marginal cost to the extent to eliminate 
all other competitors from the local market.  This is possible because negative net sales for this 
exporter can be compensated with profit increase in its own subsidiary.  However, this is not 
consistent with our observation for foreign investment data where several firms remain constantly 
in the market and make investments. 
  This counter-intuitive result might be corrected if we assume that firms in local market are 
capacity constrained so that there would be a limit for extra profit obtained by an exporter with a 
subsidiary firm by lowering its transfer price.    Another assumption more in line with WTO rules is 
that an exporter refrains itself from selling exports below marginal cost for the fear of consequent 
anti-dumping duty.  This lowest limit of transfer price is assumed for differentiated products for 
oligopoly exporters in the Appendix A-2 and we obtained similar effect of ownership on exchange 
rate pass-through for oligopoly cases as well.    The result is summarized as Proposition A2. 
        Now, we need to reinterpret the results of our models in terms of possible empirical hypothesis 
with our use of particular dataset.    Since we are able to distinguish the purpose of investments, i.e. 
distribution or manufacturing, from our data, we need to make correspondence between purpose of 
investments and our models.    For FDI categorized as distribution purpose, we could directly apply 
the results of section 3.    For manufacturing plant FDI, we need to distinguish between vertical FDI 
and horizontal FDI.  We summarized the expected sign of foreign direct investment effects and 
supporting theories with assumptions in Table 4. 
 
  185.3. GMM for Dynamic Panel Data Model 
  With consideration of the nature of time series property of dependent variable, export price, it is 
advisable to include the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable. 
  1 it it it it it i it pp e e F D I δ βγ α − =+ + + + ε       ( 2 5 )  
 
One advantage of this framework over a static model is that it allows long-term pass-through 
elasticity to be different from short-term pass-through elasticity.  Coefficients of a dynamic panel 
data model of equation (25) is no longer unbiasedly estimated with a conventional 
within-transformation estimator, or least squared dummy variable estimator, hence force LSDV 
estimator.  Although LSDV estimator is consistent when sample size in time dimension 
approaches infinity, it is inconsistent for fixed T when sample size in cross-section dimension 
becomes infinite, see Nickell (1981) and Beggs and Nerlove (1988).    This is severe problem since 
many applications which use panel series data tend to have wider size of cross-section dimension 
than time dimension. Consistent estimation methodology is then suggested by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) with the use of instrumental variables in a differenced form, 
 
  it it it it it it FDI e e p p ε γ β δ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − ) ( 1       ( 2 6 )  
 
where instrumental variables are chosen to be either   or  2 − it p 2 − ∆ it p .  However, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) pointed out that Anderson and Hsiao estimator is inefficient because it neither exploits 
all moment conditions nor take into account of disturbance term structure.  Arelllano and Bond 
then proposed consistent GMM estimator for fixed T and large N.  Aggregating explanatory 
variables as a matrix, equation  (26)  can be restated as 
 
  ε α ∆ + ∆ = ∆ X p .          ( 2 7 )  
 
With a matrix Z consisting of instrumental variables as vectors, a corresponding sample moment 




gN   and each component is a summation taken over in 
cross-section direction.  Given a weighting matrix, A, and existence of an estimator, a GMM 
estimator is    { }
'
N N GMM Ag = α min arg g ∈ α .    For our linear estimator, a GMM estimator can be 
analytically solved to be 
   GMM α        ( 2 8 )   p ZAZ X X ZAZ X ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ =
− ' ' ) ' ' (
1
 
As valid instruments for predetermined variables, in differenced form of (26) or (27) more than 
two-lagged level variable is orthogonal to current differenced disturbances.    For strictly exogenous 
variables, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggests that all past and future level variables are orthogonal 
to current differenced disturbances.  However, we will use only current differenced variables as 
instruments for strictly exogenous variables as they appear as explanatory variables in equation (26) 
for the ease of computation although we will exhaust all instruments for predetermined variable. 
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HZ Z A  (30) 
 
Weighting matrix for efficient GMM2 estimator is calculated from the residuals of consistent 
GMM1 estimator, 
 
X Z Z A ∆ ∆ = ∆ ∆ ∆ = GMM1 2 - p      ˆ          where ' ˆ ˆ ' α ε ε ε         ( 3 1 )  
 
  Although GMM variant estimators for dynamic panel model possess desirable property of 
asymptotic consistency, there still remain some caveats implementing this methodology to our data 
sample.  Formulation of GMM suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) relays its asymptotic 
property on large size of cross-sections. Our data sample for annual series consists of 11 years and 
10-13 cross-section countries.  Although our use of monthly series data for the same period 
expands time dimension to 12 folds, the size of cross-section sample remains same.  For monthly 
data, it might be more convincing to use a with-in estimator for its consistency in time dimension.  
Moreover, it is not clear if the large sample property of GMM estimator holds at all for our data 
samples
8. 
  In fact, there are number of research that compares the small sample property of GMM 
estimator with other alternative estimators.  Arellano and Bond (1991) themselves simulated with 
the sample size of T=7 and N=100 to conclude that biases in GMM estimators are much small than 
within-estimator.    Judson and Owen (1999) compares small sample bias of LSDV and GMM 
estimators for the sample size of T=5 to 30 and N=20 by Monte Carlo simulation
9.         
                                                      
8  Tauchen (1986) is, among other authors, first to report the small sample bias problem of GMM 
estimators. 
9  They also provide results for the sample size of N=100, but this case is not applicable for our data 
  21 
5.4. Data source 
  The Japan Exports and Imports, Japan Tariff Association, contains values and quantities for 
nine-digit CCFTS-classified commodities by country
10. The Commodity Classification for Foreign 
Trade Statistics, CCFTS, is based upon the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System, HS.  The values of commodity export are the FOB values. We calculated a unit price for 
each commodity from dividing corresponding value by quantity.  The Overseas Japanese 
Companies Data, Toyo Keizai, contains relevant information for approximately 19000 Japanese 
foreign subsidiaries.  From 68 industry classifications, electronics manufacturer (1900) and 
electronics wholesaler (3700) were actually used, totaling 3204 subsidiary firm data.    The average 
exchange rates for Taiwan are obtained from Financial Statistics, Taiwan District, Republic of 
China and other destination countries are obtained from the International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund. 
  
5.5. Selection process for products and countries 
  For a preliminary empirical examination, we selected three commodities satisfying the two 
criteria, among the largest share in exports and sufficient FDI observation for corresponding 
commodity.  In addition, we narrow down the commodity classification to only electronics 
products due to its overwhelming share in the Japanese exports.  Some of the candidates are 
dispelled due to the shot length of time for the availability.  With these selection procedures, 
chosen are video recording or reproducing apparatus of magnetic tape-type (852110000), parts of 
electronic integrated circuits or microassemblies (854290000), and electrostatic photocopier 
(900912000)
11.  The volumes and unit prices of these products for total exports are shown in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
availability.  
10    See Takagi and Yoshida (2001) for a more description of this data source. 
11    The values of exports in 1998 for video, IC, and copier are 197 billion, 273 billion, and 390 
billion yen, respectively.    We note that the 1998-export value of the largest export of Japan, motor 
cars with engine exceeding 2000cc but not exceeding 3000cc, is 2017 billion yen.   
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  For each product, sample countries are selected only if its share in 1998-export value for that 
product exceeds one percent share. Sample countries for video are Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE, UK, US; for 
copier, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Singapore, Taiwan, UK, US; for IC, Germany, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand, UK, US. This selection process avoids unfavorably excessive volatility of export 
price due to a change in the composition within the product category and missing data due to the 
lack of transaction for more than a year. 
 
5.6. Construction of FDI variables 
  As a first proxy for the relevant FDI data, we used the total number of foreign subsidiaries in 
electronics and electronics parts industry by country.  This FDI data, denoted as FDIIND, is a 
common variable for all products.  Since foreign subsidiaries for specific products are not 
distinguished, counting all subsidiaries in electronics industry as relevant FDI may also pick up 
interactive effects among subsidiaries, considered as distribution or/and production network effects.   
For a given product, however, it is likely to blur the significant effect of establishing a relevant 
subsidiary from an irrelevant subsidiary. 
  Next, we created product level FDI dummy variables for each product, taking a value of one if 
there exists a related foreign subsidiary for specific product in a destination country and a 
distinction between distribution and production subsidiaries is also made.  DEALB and PLANTN 
denote for subsidiary for distribution and production, respectively.    These dummy variables take a 
value of zero for years in which the first subsidiary is not present yet and one for years with at least 
one firm.  Since these dummy variables do not assess the number of multiple subsidiaries, 
estimated coefficient may understate the effect of foreign subsidiary for a country with multiple 
subsidiaries.  Finally, DEALN and PLANTN are created for the number of subsidiary in a 
destination country.    The summary statistics for FDI data are given in Table 5. 
  236. Estimation results 
6.1 Annual data 
  First, we have estimated exchange rate pass-through for three major electronics products, using 
annual data of sample period between 1988 to 1998.    Advantages of using annual data are that we 
can control to some extent for lagged response of export prices to the time of subsidiary 
establishment and use this as a preliminary investigation to be compared with the result of monthly 
data for robustness of our empirical results.  Table 6 - 8 presents LSDV estimation results of 
annual exchange rate pass-through for video, copier, and IC parts, respectively.  Surprisingly, the 
first column (i) of each table show that the electronics industry-wide FDI is statistically significant 
except for video price.  However, the estimated coefficient is less than one-thousandth of the size 
of the coefficients of exchange rate term.  At this aggregate level we can find only a weak 
evidence of FDI effect on exchange rate pass-through.     
  Next, we disaggregate industry-level subsidiary data further to product-specific level in oreder 
to match exactly to HS 9-digit product specification, as described in subsection 5.6.    Furthermore, 
we break down subsidiaries for the purpose of their investments; distribution or production.  
DEALB and PLANTB are constructed as binary dummy variable to correctly capture the presence of 
subsidiaries in local market without regard to the number of establishments.  We have used these 
dummy variables to capture the impact effect of direct ownership of Japanese subsidiary in local 
market, drawing clear distinction between a market in which some Japanese subsidiary are present 
and a market without any Japanese subsidiary.  FDI estimators in specification (ii) indicate that 
both distribution and production purpose investment have statistical significant effect on the degree 
of exchange rate pass-through, except for the production subsidiary for IC parts.  The negative 
signs for distribution subsidiary found for video and copier price indicates that bargaining power for 
exporters must have increased relatively large after establishing subsidiaries in foreign markets (see 
Proposition 1, section3.) 
  However, the positive sign of distribution subsidiary for IC parts indicates that Japanese 
exporters of IC parts could not have gained relatively strong bargaining position with respect to IC 
  24parts customers (see Lemma 1, section 3.)    This interpretation of IC-parts result is not surprising if 
we consider exogenous factors in IC industry.    Here, we distinguish clearly between “IC parts” and 
complete “IC products”.  Due to the fact competition in IC products are becoming severer each 
year during the sample period and prices of IC products are decreasing, faced with constantly 
emerging new IC products of ever-higher performance.    The condition of excessive competition in 
IC supply at IC product market might not allow IC-parts suppliers to gain an increase in their 
bargaining power over IC products manufactures. 
  With manufacturing plant subsidiaries, the effect on exchange rate pass-through is significantly 
positive for video and copier.    This is inconsistent with Proposition2, sec 4.     
  Instead of binary dummy variables for Japanese subsidiaries, we also used number of Japanese 
subsidiaries for FDI variables and the results are shown in specification (iii).  There were not any 
statistically significant changes in sign of coefficients except for production FDI for copier.  With 
this result we are left with production FDI for video being the only empirical result inconsistent 
with theoretical counterparts. 
  While we expect the sign of coefficients to be constantly negative for production FDI from our 
theory, it is noteworthy to state that there is a possibility of change in the sign of coefficients for 
distribution FDI as the number of Japanese subsidiary increases in an importing country.  It is 
plausible that while DEALB variable captures the breakthrough effect on exporters’ bargaining 
position of establishing exporters’ own distribution network, DEALN variable captures less 
dramatic increase of bargaining position of exporters.  This difference in increase of bargaining 
power of exporters might result in with negative coefficient of DEALB and positive coefficient of 
DEALN.  We try to capture this possibility by incorporating both variables in specification (iv).  
In specification (v), we included time dummies to control for any marginal cost changes in 
exporting  side.   
  For video in Table 6, the coefficient of DEALB is statistically negative at one percent level but 
it is insignificant for DEALN regardless of inclusion of time dummies.    For copier in Table 7, the 
coefficient for DEALB and DEALN are negative and positive, respectively, both statistically 
  25significant at five percent level with time dummies.  For these two products, the above scenario 
seems to be an explanation.    However, for IC parts in Table 8 it is only statistically significant for 
DEALN when time dummy is excluded while it is statistically significant for DEALB in both 
specifications. 
  Overall, we found that the effect of subsidiary on the degree of exchange rate are statistically 
significant.    For distribution subsidiaries, the existence of subsidiary, which is captured in DEALB 
variable, put downward effect on exchange rate pass-through for video and copier while positive 
effect is observed for IC-parts.    For production subsidiaries, multinational production decreases the 
degree of exchange rate pass-through for copier and video as expected from our theoretical sections, 
but it makes exchange rate pass-through higher for video prices.  Inclusion of time dummies did 
not affect the coefficient of subsidiary interaction term while the coefficient of exchange rate is 
greatly affected in some cases.   
  
6.2 Monthly Data 
  From Table 9 – 11, we have summarized estimation results for the same three electronics 
products with monthly data.  Since export price data are expected to possess autoregressive 
property with the use of higher frequency data, we choose to include lagged export price as an 
explanatory variable instead of using ad hoc time dummy variables.  Our estimation specification 
is shown in equation (25) and we used least square dummy variable estimation for Table 9 - 11.  
  Specification (i) includes FDI variables for distribution and production as number of 
subsidiaries and specification (ii) adds binary distribution FDI variable to capture the structural 
change in the presence of Japanese subsidiaries.  Surprisingly, the results are qualitatively very 
similar to annual data estimation despite the differences in specification form for dynamic property 
of export prices.  For video, distribution subsidiaries seem to lower the degree of exchange rate 
pass-through while production subsidiaries increase exchange rate pass-through. For copier the sign 
of coefficients for distribution subsidiaries are all negative but not statistically significant if 
included simultaneously and production subsidiaries decrease exchange rate pass-through.  For 
  26IC-parts the distribution subsidiary coefficient is positive for binary variable and negative for count 
variable and production subsidiary coefficient is negative.     
  Up to now we have only examined foreign direct investments in major importing countries
12 
and discarded possibly strategically important subsidiaries in nearby countries.  In specifications 
(iii) and (iv) we formulate two important regional variables; Asia and Europe.  In these region 
variables, Japanese subsidiaries in countries that are excluded from our sample are also added as 
well as those countries in sample.  We continued to distinguish between distribution and 
production subsidiaries but only used count data variables. 
  For video exports, inclusion of these regional variables does not affect the coefficients of 
distribution subsidiaries, however, the coefficients of production are no longer statistically 
significant with area variables.  Europe variables are both statistically significant at one percent 
level while Asia variables are insignificant.  Japanese subsidiaries in a neighboring European 
country can affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through for another country in Europe where as 
this is not so in Asia.  Since Europe variable for production subsidiaries is positive, it has been 
European countries for video which drives positive sign in exchange rate pass-through estimation in 
other specifications in monthly data as well as annual data. 
  For copier exports, coefficients of FDI variables are quite robust to inclusion of regional 
variables.  Count data for distribution subsidiaries in region are statistically significant at one 
percent level for both Europe and Asia.  For production subsidiaries, only Europe is significant at 
five percent level and its sign is positive.  We should not misinterpret this positive sign for 
production as inconsistent with our theory.  It is only representing that negative effect of 
production on exchange rate pass-through is less in absolute term in Europe.  For example, one 
production subsidiary in Europe decreases exchange rate pass-through 10.8 percent while one 
production subsidiary in Asia decreases by 12.7 percent in specification (iii). 
  For IC-parts exports, the coefficients of production variable become statistically insignificant 
                                                      
12  As described in section 5.5 we have narrowed country sample by selecting only those with their 
share in 1998-export value exceed one percent. 
  27when regional variables are included.    All regional subsidiary variables are statistically significant 
with negative sign except Asian distribution variable.  It is noteworthy that the magnitude of 
coefficient for European production subsidiaries is about same size of those of exchange rate 
variable. 
  From these excises, we can conclude that it is more likely in Europe that Japanese subsidiary in 
one country affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through in neighboring counties.  This is 
consistent to our intuition that subsidiaries in Europe are intended to be part of European regional 
network for Japanese multinationals while subsidiaries in Asia might be export hub to other regions 
of the world. 
  As we noted in section 5.3, dynamic panel model specification does not necessarily obtain 
consistent estimators when observation is small in both direction of time and cross-section.    There 
is not distinct number of observations in time dimension that can assure consistency in the 
coefficients of explanatory variables for dynamic panel model estimation.  So we also estimated 
export price regression via one-step generalized method of moment suggested in Arellano and Bond 
(1991).    The results are summarized in Table 12 and It turned out that the signs of coefficients are 
same as LSDV estimators.  Moreover, we have calculated bias for LSDV estimators by using 
one-step GMM estimators as consistent initial estimators as suggested in Kiviet (1995).   
Surprisingly, bias of LSDV estimators with our 132 observation in time dimension has shown to be 
around one hundredth in magnitude of estimated coefficients in Table 13.  With these additional 
information, we can conclude our empirical result is quite robust. 
   
7. Conclusion, Caveats, and Policy Implications 
  We have presented theoretical models distinguishing between distribution and production 
subsidiaries for foreign direct investment.    For a distribution FDI model, we have included features 
as partial ownership and bargaining between an exporter and a local distributor.  We have shown 
that exchange rate pass-through decreases only if significant increase in bargaining power for an 
exporter is obtained after acquiring ownership of a distribution firm.  Therefore, it is important to 
  28determine what factors might affect the change in bargaining power for exporters when downstream 
firm is acquired.    For a model of production FDI, we have shown that exchange rate pass-through 
unambiguously decreases when an exporter establishes local plants in an importing country. 
  Among Japanese multinationals playing an important role for world FDI, we have selected 
electronics industry, one of two most important industries in Japan, for our empirical target.  For 
we intend to use most disaggregate trade data publicly available in Japan to match exactly with 
specific product foreign direct investment data, we have chosen three electronics products; namely 
video player, copier machine and IC-parts.    Data sample are span between 1988 and 1998 to cover 
most active time of Japanese foreign direct investments. 
  Our empirical result indicates that inclusion of FDI variable properly constructed to capture the 
type of subsidiary and the timing of establishment is essential to the estimation of exchange rate 
pass-through.  Observing estimation results from our limited number of products in electronics 
industry we tentatively conclude that establishing own distribution network in local market are 
more likely to strengthen significantly the bargaining power of an exporter and consequently 
exchange rate pass-through will be decreased.  Conforming to the results of Gron and Swenson 
(1996), we also consistently found the significant downward effect of local production on exchange 
rate pass-through.  Only one empirical result inconsistent with our theoretical prediction is 
estimated positive sign for production subsidiaries for IC products.  European regional FDI 
variable indicates it is most phenomenal in Europe, and here we need to further investigate 
underlying features in production model to explain this empirical observation. 
  Empirically, we have also found out that Japanese subsidiaries in neighboring countries can 
affect the degree of exchange rate pass-through of a country in the region.    Our results indicate that 
this is more prevalent in European region than among Asian  countries.  This  is quite consistent to 
our intuition that foreign subsidiaries of Japanese multinationals in Europe are aimed for European 
markets while subsidiaries in Asia are constituents of an export hub for the world market.       
    While most explanations in exchange rate pass-through and pricing-to-market literature for 
different degree of export price responsiveness with respect to exchange rate among industry and 
  29countries implicitly points to differences in market structures in addition to demand structures and 
production function, we are able to show explicitly the presence of foreign subsidiaries in local 
market can significantly change the degree of exchange rate pass-through.  Moreover, we are also 
able to explain the dynamic behavior of exchange rate pass-through due to a change in 
establishment of own network for both production and distribution.         
  Although our theoretical models are in partial equilibrium settings, regarding the overall effect 
of foreign direct investment on pass-through, it is essential to incorporate the role of foreign 
subsidiaries in new open economy macroeconomics research.    A further investigation is necessary 
to correctly assess the direction of effects from the ongoing world trend for globalization and 
regionalization on balance of payment adjustments. 
 
 
  30Appendix A: Differentiated Products Duopoly 
  In this appendix, we show that general result of our model in section 3 still holds when the 
number of exporters is expanded to more than a single firm.  We restrict our model to duopoly 
exporters case, but we believe that it can be generalized to N-oligopoly exporters case.  We start 
from consumer’s maximization problem and derive inverse demands for differentiated products as 
in Singh and Vives (1984).  At consumer markets two downstream firms, D1 and D2, supply 
differentiated goods in a Cournot competition.  Each downstream firm purchases exports from 
different exporters, U1 and U2.  D1 (D2) bargains transfer price with U1 (U2).  In this appendix 
we treat bargaining and ownership issues separately to clarify that same underlying forces are still 
present in duopoly frameworks.    First, we show that increase in bargaining power for one exporter, 
holding constant bargaining power for another exporter, decreases the level of exchange rate 
pass-through, assuming zero share ownership of downstream firms by exporters.  This pure 
bargaining effect corresponds to equation (12) in section 3. Next, we demonstrate that acquiring full 
ownership of a downstream firm by an exporter increases the degree of exchange rate pass-through 
when bargaining power for both exporters are one.  This pure ownership effect corresponds to 
equation  (13)  in section 3.    We therefore conclude that our result from the model in section 3 can 
be extended to the real world case in which multiple foreign direct investments are taken 




  Consumers are assumed to have a quadratic form utility function with symmetricity 
imposed for the ease of calculation.  The center of our concern here are two differentiated goods, 
q1 and q2.    Income is denoted as I and q0 is the bundle of other goods and also acts as a numeraie.   
We also assume the coefficient for cross-product term is strictly smaller than the coefficient of 
                                                      
13  We will not show any formal analysis for the interaction effect between bargaining and 
ownership, however, we believe similar arguments in section 3 can be applied to oligopoly cases. 
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Downstream Firms: 
  The profit of downstream firm is same as in section 3.  Constant marginal cost, cD, for 
downstream firms are same for both firms and transfer price, ewi, is determined in a bargaining 
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Each downstream firm is assumed to be choosing their optimal quantity of exports, taking as given 
transfer prices of two firms and the quantity of its competitor.  The first order conditions for both 
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14 If  c = b, demand functions can not be obtained because coefficient matrix in  (A2)  is not 
invertible. 
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A-1. Upstream Firms with Bargaining: 
  The profits for exporters are also same as in section 3.  Constant marginal costs, CU, for 
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The following equation  (A10)  represents that each exporter engage in a Nash-bargaining with their 
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Solving simultaneous equations,  (A11)  and  (A12), we can obtain equilibrium transfer prices. 
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  33Inserting equilibrium transfer prices, (A13) and (A14), into (A5) and (A6), we can obtain for 
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By defining the ratio of each export to total exports as  , we can obtain the expression for 
industry price index. 
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For the proof of the following propositions, we derive four differential terms with respect to 
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Lemma A1:    An industry transfer price is represented as a convex combination of (a - cD) and ecU, 
an increase in industry transfer price implies decrease in the level of exchange rate. 
 
Proof: 
From the coefficients of (a - cD) and ecU in (A13) and (A14), each transfer price can be easily 
  34shown to be a convex combination of (a - cD) and ecU.  Therefore,  we  denote  12 ,[ 0 , 1 ] λ λ ∈ for the 
coefficients of (a - cD) in (A13) and (A14), respectively.  By definition in (A17), industry transfer 
price is also a convex combination of each transfer prices, namely ew1 and  ew2.  We denote 
[0,1] δ ∈  for the coefficient of ew1.  Then, we can rewrite the industry transfer price in terms of 
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It can be easily checked that the coefficients are within the range of 0 to 1 and the sum of 
coefficients is 1.    Therefore we proved the first part of lemma and we rewrite the industry transfer 
price with  .   ˆ [0,1] δ ∈ ˆˆ () ( 1 ) D U ew a c ec δδ =− + − . 
 Since  (a - cD) > ec and ew is a covex combination of these two terms, increase in ew must 
come from increase in 
ˆ δ . Now we derive the exchange rate pass-through for industry transfer 
price. 
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On the other hand, increase in  ˆ δ   ambiguously implies decrease in exchange rate pass-through. 
Q.E.D.  
 
  Now we are ready to state for differentiated duopoly exporters the first proposition 
consistent with the model in section 3 that increase in bargaining power decreases the exchange rate 
pass-through. 
 
Proposition A1: If initial bargaining powers are equal for two exporters, increase in bargaining 
power for one exporter decreases the level of exchange rate pass-through. 
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  Using Lemma A1, we only need to show increase in bargaining power increases industry 
transfer price.  The differential of industry transfer price with respect to the bargaining power of 
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Second equality follows from using equation (A18) and (A19).  Since all terms in (A22) are 
positive except for (ew2 – ew1) term, industry transfer price increases if (ew2 – ew1) term is 
non-negative.  From (A13) and (A14), we obtain equation (A23) and (ew2 – ew1) is non-negative 
if and only if  21 α α ≥ . 
 
2












−= − − −
−
            ( A 2 3 )  
Q.E.D. 
 
A-2. Upstream Firms with Full Ownership: 
  Now in this subsection we deal with ownership effect on industry transfer price.    In order 
to simplify the argument in what follows we maintain the assumption that bargaining power of 
exporters are one,  12 1 α α ==
1
.  In addition we restrict our analysis to the extreme case of full 
ownership, i.e.  i β = , to accentuate the incentive for driving out a competitor in which a transfer 
price can go down below zero.  After showing that possibility, we will put reasonable restriction 
on the lowest transfer price; that is a marginal-cost of exporter. 
 
[Benchmark case: no ownership] 
  We first derive the level of industry transfer price for a bench mark case when there is no 
ownership.  Since market share and transfer price are same between two differentiated export 
products in this symmetric case, industry transfer price of  (A17)  can be treated to be equal to either 
  36of  transfer  price, (A13) or (A14).  With  assumption of full ownership, industry transfer price can 
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[Single full-ownership case] 
  We consider now a case in which one of exporters acquires full ownership of a counterpart 
downstream firm; henceforth we assume this exporter to be U1.    We first need to modify the profit 
of U1 exporter by adding up net sales revenue and the profit of downstream subsidiary in terms of 
currency of exporting country. 
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With using  (A5)  and  (A7), the first order condition of maximizing  (A26)  can be arranged for best 
response transfer price function. 
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Lemma A2: If bargaining power in vertical relationship with a downstream firm entirely falls on an 
exporter, full-ownership acquirement of a downstream firm by one exporter leads to set transfer 
price below zero. 
  When an exporter acquires ownership of downstream firm in a monopoly exporter 
  37framework in section 3, the exporter had an incentive to lower a transfer price because its loss in net 
sales revenue can be compensated with extra income stream from the increase profit of downstream 
firm.    Under a duopoly setting, an exporter has additional incentive to lower a transfer price further.   
Corresponding increase in the profit of counterpart downstream firm is augmented by squeezing out 
the market share of the other downstream competitor.   
  Since negative transfer price is only possible in a real world by subsidizing downstream 
firms more in absolute term than transfer price, this strategy is very unlikely to be actually taken.  
Moreover, anti-dumping trade rules usually forbid exporter to set its transfer price lower than its 
marginal cost.  Therefore, we enforce additional restriction on transfer price,  .  With 
this floor price restriction, maximization for the profit of U1 exporter yields a corner solution and it 
can be substituted in  (A12)  to obtain equilibrium transfer prices. 















              ( A 2 9 )  
These equilibrium transfer prices can be used for (A5) and (A6) to obtain equilibrium quantities for 
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Now we can use (A17), (A29) and (A30) to obtain equilibrium industry transfer price and 
corresponding exchange rate pass-through. 
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              ( A 3 2 )  
The exchange rate pass-through in (A32) can be compared with the benchmark case of (A25) to 
show that full-ownership acquirement of downstream firm by an exporter increases exchange rate 
pass-through.    We summarize the result in the following lemma. 
  38Lemma A3: If bargaining power in vertical relationship with a downstream firm entirely falls on an 
exporter and transfer price can not be allowed to be lower than marginal cost of exporters, 
full-ownership acquirement of a downstream firm by one exporter increases exchange rate 
pass-through. 
 
[Both full-ownership case] 
  We now turn to the case both exporters fully acquire ownership of each counterpart 
downstream firm.  Since we has already derived best-response transfer-price function for U1 in 
equation (A27), we rewrite it here with best-response transfer-price function for U2 obtained by a 
symmetric argument.   
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(A35) 
By summing up A and B, it can be shown that transfer price is linear combination of (a - cD) and ecU, 
but not a convex combination because A is non-positive.    So the sign of transfer price is dependent 
on the relative sizes of b and c and relative size of (a - cD) and ecU.    Figure 15 represents regions of 
sings of transfer price and transfer price is equal to marginal cost of exporters only on the bold line.   
 
Lemma A4: If bargaining power in vertical relationship with a downstream firm entirely falls on an 
exporter, full-ownership acquirement of a downstream firm by both exporters leads to set transfer 
price below marginal cost of exporters.    Transfer prices are set equal to marginal cost if and only if   
  39(a - cD) = ecU or c = 0. 
 
  From the above lemma, if we continue to assume there is some trade regulation restricting 
the floor price for cross-border price of tradable goods, equilibrium transfer prices are obtained at a 
corner solution from optimization of exporters’ profits.  Therefore, industry transfer price is also 
equal to marginal cost of exporters and the exchange rate pass-through becomes one, i.e. a complete 
pass-through. 
 
Lemma 5: If bargaining power in vertical relationship with a downstream firm entirely falls on an 
exporter and transfer price can not be allowed to be lower than marginal cost of exporters, 
full-ownership acquirement of a downstream firm by both exporters yields a complete exchange 
rate pass-through. 
 
  We can summarize our results from this subsection about ownership effect on exchange 
rate pass-through using Lemma 2 to 5 in the next proposition.  Although we have only provided 
proofs for proposition A1 and A2 in the case of duopoly, we believe similar arguments apply to the 
case of arbitrary number of oligopoly exporters and these propositions are basis for our hypothesis 
regarding a possible interaction within each export product in our empirical section. 
 
Proposition A2: If bargaining power in vertical relationship with a downstream firm entirely falls on 
an exporter and transfer price can not be allowed to be lower than marginal cost of exporters, 
sequential foreign direct investments by different exporters in an industry of differentiated products 
in terms of full-ownership acquirement of a downstream firm increases the level of exchange rate 
pass-through. 
 
  40Appendix B: 
[General analysis of exchange rate pass-through for n-plants] 
  Profit for n-domestic-plants firm is, 
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In equation  (B3)  exchange rate pass-through is broken down to two components, demand elasticity 
term and marginal cost term.  In the following we first establish that these two components are 
contributing to incomplete pass-through separately, with our specification for a model. 
 
[The value of exchange rate pass-through with our model specification] 





i q C , we can obtain total production level at equilibrium by algebraically solving the n sets 
of first order conditions.     
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= ε          ( B 6 )  
Equation (B5) and (B6) are obtained by substituting equilibrium production value (B4) for demand 
function and demand elasticity. 
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Marginal cost function term in  (B3)  can be also derived as 
 









.        ( B 8 )  
 
We confirm that each component separately reduce the exchange rate pass-through from unity.     














=        ( B 9 )  
 
It is well known that constant elasticity demand, which can be derived from CES utility form, leads 
(B7) to be zero and constant marginal cost leads (B8) to be zero.  Both specifications combined 
would result in complete pass-through as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Betts and Devereux 
(2000)
15. 
                                                      
15  Although they are aware of the fact pricing-to-market, at least in short term, does not occur 
  42 
[The effect of increase in the number of domestic plants on the exchange rate pass-through] 
  We can analyze the effect of increase in the number of domestic plants on the exchange rate 
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     ( B 1 1 )  
The effect on exchange rate pass-through from marginal cost term in  (B12)  is positive. 
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      ( B 1 3 )  
 
 
because price elasticity of demand in each country are identical, their assumptions also put a strict 
restriction that exchange rate pass-through must be complete. 
  43  From equation  (B13), the effect of increase in the number of domestic plants on exchange rate 
pass-through is decreasing if  2 n ec < .    This condition can be interpreted as the bounded-above 
condition for a curvature of cost function.  The difference between the condition in the appendix 
and section 4 comes from an infinitesimal change effect in the appendix and discrete jump effect in 
section 4.    It is noteworthy that bounded-above condition becomes less stringent as the number of 
domestic plants becomes large.  Therefore, once this condition holds for expansion from single 
plant to two plants, it continues to hold for any extent of new plants establishments.  Here, we 
establish that claim in section 4 do not depend on a specific number of plants we used in analysis, 
namely one and two.       
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Shares owned by local firms are combined when there are more
than one local firms.  Local firms here are defined as those firms






Note: 375 subsidiary firms not accounting shareholding informantion were excluded from original 19,197 data sets.  In "(Japan + recipient)
only" category combined shareholding by Japanese parent companies and local firms in a recipient country sums to 100% for 12,660 firms.
For the remaining 402 firms in this category, the sum of shares is less than 100% due to unreported figures.  "sub only" represents that
combined sharehoding by Japanese parent companies and local firms in a recipient country is zero.  All shares of almost all subsidiaries in
this category are owned by another single subsidiary company, representing 2,300 firms. All shares of 116 firms in this category are owned
by more than one subsidiary companies.  For the remaining 180 firms in this category total shares do not sum up to 100% due to unreported
figures.  For the firms, shares of which do not sum upto 100%, are shown in shaded area.  For "(Japan + local) + sub" category, direct
calculation was not readily available.
(Japan + local) only
(Japan + local) + sub
sub only
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27.3%
Excluding those with combined share of Japanese MNCs
and Thai firms is zero
Total = 1,269 firmsFigure 9:  Purpose of FDI (Sales, Production, or both)
Note: The "sales" box and "production" box  indicate that the purposes of FDI include "sales" and "production, "
respectively.  So subsidiaries counted as "sales" or "production" may or may not act as "service, lease or R&D"
subsidiaries as well.
Total Subsidiaries   (19,197 firms)
Sales  ( 9,675 firms), 50.4%
Production   (8,097 firms),42%
Service, Lease, R&D or
others (6,480 firms)
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Figure 11: (Example: α0 = 0.5 and β0 = 0)










































(1,000yen)Figure16: Regions for ew1 in Lemma A4

























ecU > ew1 > 0
0 > ecU
0Japanese parent company China Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Thailand UK Germany USA Total
N E C 1 2 424534435 4 6
T D K 6 3 121112 1 2 2 9
Yuasa 2 112111313 1 6
Omron 5 113231358 3 2
Sharp 3 135232312 2 5
Seiko 6 211221224 2 3
Sony 5 313224134 2 8
Pioneer 1 1 1122316 1 8
Yokokawa 6 22211232 2 1
Kyosera 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 11 29
Mitsubishi Electronics 10 222116316 3 4
Sanyo Electronics 14 3 1 2 3 2 5 30
Sanyo Electronics Trade 5 2 3 411356 3 0
Matsushita Electronics 17 2 2 1025555 1 0 6 3
Matsushita Denko 5 121133131 2 1
Toshiba 8 233515538 4 3
Victor 4 13313332 2 3
Hitachi 14 125554228 4 8
Fujitu 7 2 542243 1 3 4 2
Fuji Electoroinics 9 211231112 2 3
Total 142 38 28 54 51 46 49 53 53 120 634
Note: There are 3,205 Japanese subsidiary firms in Electronics and Parts (1900) and Electronics and Parts Wholesale (3700).  The table summarizes
for top 20 Japanese parent corporations with most subsidiaries by top 10 countries.
Table1 : Top 20 Japanese electronics coporations with most subsidiaries by countryTable 2: Business description for Subsidiaries of Matsushita Electronics in China
Name of subsidiary business description starting date of operation
Matsushita-Wanbao(Guangzhou)Air Conditioner Co.,Ltd. Air conditioner (production & sales) 199306
Matsushita-Wanbao(Guangzhou)Compressor Co.,Ltd. compressor for air conditioner (production & sales) 199306
Matsushita-Wanbao(Guangzhou)Electric Iron Co.,Ltd. electric iron (production, sales and after-service) 199212
Zhuhai Matsushita Electric Motor Co.,Ltd. electric motor for AV and OA products (production & sales) 199305
Beijing Matsushita Communication Equipment Co.,Ltd. pager and mobile phones (production & sales) 199207
Hangzhou Matsushita Home Appliance Co.,Ltd. laundry machines and parts (sales & production) 199204
Matsushita Audio(Xiamen)Co.,Ltd. headphone stereo, clock radio, stereo compo (production & sales) 199309
Shanghai Matsushita Microwave Oven Co.,Ltd. microwave (production & sales) 199408
China Hualu Matsushita AVC Co.,Ltd. video and main components (production & sales) 199406
Hangzhou Matsushita Motor Co.,Ltd. electric motor for consumer electronics (production & sales) 199411
Shandong Matsushita Television & Visual Co.,Ltd. color televisions (production & sales) 199606
Beijing Matsushita Precision Capacitor Co.,Ltd. film condenser (production & sales) 199608
Jian Song Electric(Xiamen)Co.,Ltd. electronics parts, monitor, motor, audio components for automobiles (production) 199604
Hangzhou Matsushita Kitchen Appliances Co.,Ltd. rice cooker, rice polisher and parts (production & sales) 199803
Panasonic SH Industrial Sales(Shenzhen)Co.,Ltd. manufacturing machine and factory automation related products (sales & services) 199409
Panasonic Industrial(Shanghai)Co.,Ltd. manufacturing machine and factory automation related products (sales & services) 199604
Panasonic Industrial(Tianjin)Co.,Ltd. manufacturing machine and  factory automation related products (sales & services) 199812
Table 3: Business description for Subsidiaries of Fujitsu in US
Name of subsidiary business description
Fujitsu Business Communication Systems,Inc. comunication devices (production, sales, maintenance and development) 197603
Fujitsu Microelectronics,Inc. simiconductor (production, sales and R&D) 197908
Fujitsu Network Communications,Inc. comunication devices (transmiter and switch) (development, prduction, sales, maintenance) 199110
Fujitsu Computer Products of America,Inc. computer products (development, production, sales and maintenance service) 199109
HAL Computer Systems,Inc. 64-bits high SPARC prossessor (development) and Unix workstation (development, production and sales) 199005
Amdahl Corp. computer (production & sales) and magnetic disc drive (sales) 197010
Fujitsu PC Corp. PC computer (development, production & sales) 199602
Reliance Computer Corp. chip set for computer and server (development) 199411
Fujitsu America,Inc. imformatioin processing machines (imports & sales) 196807
Fujitsu Systems Business of America,Inc. system support for computer products 198806
Fujitsu Personal Systems,Inc. mobile computer (sales) 198801
Fujitsu-ICL Systems,Inc. logistics system, ATM, logistics HHT (sales and maintenance) 199204
Fujitsu Compound Semiconductor,Inc. compound semiconductor (R&D and sales) 199210Table 4: The Summary of Expected Sign of Foreign Direct Investments Coefficients
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distribution
(Lemma 1, Sec 3) no or small increase in bargaining power relative to
increase in ownership
(Proposition 1, Sec 3) relatively large increase in bargaining power
after FDI
plants Table 5: Summary Statistics FDI Variables
Video mean std. dev. min max
FDIIND 79.50 89.58 0 411
DEALB 0.24 0.43 0 1
DEALN 0.69 1.44 0 6
PLANTB 0.31 0.46 0 1
PLANTN 0.46 0.75 0 2
Copier
FDIIND 90.12 85.91 2 411
DEALB 0.34 0.47 0 1
DEALN 0.43 0.67 0 2
PLANTB 0.31 0.46 0 1
PLANTN 0.45 0.83 0 3
IC
FDIIND 130.98 78.53 11 411
DEALB 0.55 0.50 0 1
DEALN 1.04 1.31 0 5
PLANTB 0.66 0.47 0 1
PLANTN 1.20 1.26 0 4
Note: Sample countries for video are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy,
Netherlands, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE, UK, US; for copier, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Singapore, Taiwan, UK, US; for IC, Germany, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippine,Table6: LSDV Estimators for Annual Panel Data (video price, 1988 - 1998)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) w/ time d.
ER 0.678*** 0.593*** 0.510*** 0.573*** 1.632***
(0.127) (0.123) (0.126) (0.124) (0.290)
FDIIND*ER 0.000
(0.000)
DEALB*ER -0.183*** -0.197*** -0.196***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.029)




PLANTN*ER 0.439** 0.464*** 0.514***
(0.200) (0.177) (0.170)
(Nob. = 143)
Adj-R2 0.983 0.986 0.984 0.987 0.987
Table7: LSDV Estimators for Annual Panel Data (copier price, 1988 - 1998)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) w/ time d.
ER 1.35*** 1.255*** 1.427*** 1.430*** 0.356
(0.097) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) 0.235
FDIIND*ER -0.001***
(0.0002)
DEALB*ER -0.053*** -0.016 -0.083**
(0.019) (0.032) (0.035)




PLANTN*ER -0.230** -0.240** -0.262***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.082)
(Nob. = 143)
Adj-R2 0.986 0.984 0.985 0.985 0.991
Note: Figures in parenthesis are hetroskedastic-consistent standard erro; ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.
Note: Figures in parenthesis are hetroskedastic-consistent standard erro; ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.Table8: LSDV Estimators for Annual Panel Data (IC parts price, 1988 - 1998)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) w/ time d.
ER 1.53*** 1.734*** 1.510*** 1.640*** 1.281***
(0.182) (0.193) (0.177) (0.165) (0.325)
FDIIND*ER -0.000**
(0.000)
DEALB*ER 0.073** 0.125*** 0.123***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.037)




PLANTN*ER -0.054** -0.044* -0.032
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
(Nob. = 110)
Adj-R2 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.981 0.981
Note: Figures in parenthesis are hetroskedastic-consistent standard erro; ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.Table9: LSDV Estimators for Monthly Dynamic Panel 
(video price, 1988Jan - 1998Dec)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
P(-1) 0.642*** 0.614*** 0.593*** 0.576***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
ER 0.201*** 0.236*** 0.129*** 0.155***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
DEALB*ER -0.067*** -0.053**
(0.020) (0.021)
DEALN*ER -0.016** -0.002 -0.006 0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
PLANTN*ER 0.143** 0.171** -0.031 0.014










Adj-R2 0.985 0.986 0.986 0.986
Note: Figures in parenthesis are heterosedasticity-consistent standard deviations; ***, **, and * indicate that
the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  The estimated coefficients for country
dummies are not reported here.Table10: LSDV Estimators for Monthly Dynamic Panel 
(copier price, 1988Jan - 1998Dec)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
P(-1) 0.539*** 0.539*** 0.480*** 0.480***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052)
ER 0.690*** 0.692*** 0.693*** 0.687***
(0.089) (0.090) (0.086) (0.087)
DEALB*ER -0.005 0.014
(0.013) (0.016)
DEALN*ER -0.016** -0.012 -0.007 -0.020
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014)
PLANTN*ER -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.127*** -0.116***










Adj-R2 0.984 0.984 0.985 0.985
Note: Figures in parenthesis are heterosedasticity-consistent standard deviations; ***, **, and * indicate that
the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  The estimated coefficients for country
dummies are not reported here.Table11: LSDV Estimators for Monthly Dynamic Panel
(IC parts price, 1988Jan - 1998Dec)
Specification
Independent variable: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
P(-1) 0.803*** 0.782*** 0.756*** 0.750***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
ER 0.288*** 0.343*** 0.462*** 0.467***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047)
DEALB*ER 0.031** 0.017
(0.012) (0.013)
DEALN*ER -0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 -0.008***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
PLANTN*ER -0.013** -0.012** -0.005 -0.006










Adj-R2 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990
Note: Figures in parenthesis are heterosedasticity-consistent standard deviations; ***, **, and * indicate that
the coefficient is significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  The estimated coefficients for country
dummies are not reported here.Table 12: GMM 1-step Estimators for Monthly Dynamic Panel
Video
coef sd t p
P(-1) -0.555 0.002 -344.408 0.00
ER 0.174 0.011 15.58982 0.00
DEALB
DEALN -0.051 0.015 -3.36542 0.00
PLANTB 0.013 0.003 4.594584 0.00
PLANTN -0.087 0.025 -3.49756 0.00
ASIA-D 0.005 0.005 1.047246 0.29
EURO-D -0.013 0.010 -1.2727 0.20
ASIA-P 0.002 0.002 1.048792 0.29
EURO-P 0.089 0.012 7.139157 0.00
Copier
coef sd t p
P(-1) -0.459 0.001 -550.196 0.00
ER 0.660 0.013 49.71 0.00
DEALB -0.026 0.070 -0.37 0.71
DEALN 0.029 0.021 1.35 0.18
PLANTB 0.388 0.076 5.11 0.00
PLANTN -0.199 0.034 -5.77 0.00
ASIA-D -0.015 0.021 -0.70 0.49
EURO-D -0.012 0.000 -24.13 0.00
ASIA-P -0.011 0.025 -0.44 0.66
EURO-P 0.020 0.004 5.47 0.00
IC parts
coef sd t p
P(-1) -0.755 0.000 -1766.68 0.00
ER 0.444 0.018 24.3458 0.00
DEALB 0.022 0.014 1.573155 0.12
DEALN -0.008 0.003 -2.56442 0.01
PLANTB 0.003 0.014 0.235945 0.81
PLANTN -0.007 0.010 -0.67959 0.50
ASIA-D 0.000 0.001 -0.84308 0.40
EURO-D -0.008 0.058 -0.1421 0.89
ASIA-P -0.004 0.001 -3.21285 0.00
EURO-P -0.357 0.115 -3.11593 0.00Table 13: Bias for LSDV 
Video
LSDVc (given GMM1)
P(-1) 0.006987
ER -0.000749
DEALN 0.000232
PLANTB -0.000042
PLANTN 0.000026
ASIAD -0.000024
EUROD 0.000052
ASIAP -0.000007
EUROP -0.000268
Copier
LSDVc (given GMM1)
P(-1) 0.005136
ER -0.001937
DEALB 0.000103
DEALN -0.000111
PLANTB -0.001208
PLANTN 0.000599
ASIA-D 0.000035
EURO-D 0.000040
ASIA-P 0.000013
EURO-P -0.000127
IC parts
LSDVc (given GMM1)
P(-1) 0.004799
ER -0.001200
DEALB -0.000068
DEALN 0.000021
PLANTB -0.000015
PLANTN 0.000027
ASIA-D -0.000001
EURO-D 0.000038
ASIA-P 0.000015
EURO-P 0.000787